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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case & Proceedings
The nature of this case is more fully set forth in Northern Title Company of Idaho, Inc.'s
("Northern Title") Cross-Appellant Brief However, for purposes of this brief, Northern Title
sets forth the following proceedings regarding the disclosure of expert witnesses, and
Cummings' request for punitive damages.

1.

Disclosure of Expert Witnesses

Under the district court's Order Setting Jury Trial, Cummings' expert report was due
March 13,2012. See R., Vol. 6, p. 1091, <JI 5. Northern Title's expert report was due April 17,
2012. /d. Rebuttal reports were due May 22, 2012. /d. Expert disclosures were required

irrespective of formal discovery requests. /d. l On March 13, 2012, Cummings disclosed
Gregory Kelley as an expert appraiser, but did not disclose any of the documents Kelley would
rely upon, or his actual opinions. See R., Vol. 4,716 (PI's. Supp. Disc. of Witnesses). On June
14,2012, one day prior to Kelley's deposition, Cummings at 4:35 p.m. finally produced, in draft
form without exhibits, Kelley's report. See R., Supp. Vol. 1,57 (NT's Resp. Mem. to Pi's. Mot.

for Sanctions and Motion to Exclude Dei's. Expert). However, it was not until the next day,
upon Northern Title's arrival to Kelley's deposition, that Cummings produced Kelley's final
report with exhibits attached. /d.

1 /d. ("in responses to discovery and/or as required herein").
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Near the end of Kelly's deposition, Northern Title introduced a report by a potential
rebuttal appraisal expert, Craig Warren. See R., Supp. Vol. 1,58-59 (NT's Resp. Mem. to PI's.

Mot.for Sanctions and Motion to Exclude De!'s. Expert).2 As it would turn out, Warren's report
proved useless, where Kelley had appraised the eastern property as of 2007, while Warren had
appraised the eastern property as of 2012. See NT's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Reconsider, Supp.
Vol. 2, 251-252.
Despite his own late expert disclosures, Cummings adamantly objected, moving to
exclude Warren. See R., Supp. Vol. 1,44 (Cummings' Mem. to Exclude NT's Expert Witness).
Therefore, within twelve (12) calendar days, Northern Title responded by moving to exclude
Cummings' appraiser, Kelley. See R, Vol. 6, 1060-1062 (NT's Mot. in Limine to Exclude). On
July 6,2012, the district court granted Cummings' request and excluded Northern Title's expert.
See R., Vol. 6,1233-1236. On July 17,2012, the district court granted Northern Title's request,
and excluded Cummings' expert. See Tr., Vol. 2 1131: 19-1133:3; see also id. at 1133: 19-25.
Trying to undo his actions, Cummings moved the district court to reconsider, which on July 30,
2012, was denied. See R., Vol. 8, 1448-1450 (PI's. Mot. to Reconsider); see also Tr., Vol. 2,
1211: 19-1212:4.

2 Explaining (1) introduction of Warren report was due to Kelly's newly learned deposition
testimony that he had actually conferred with and relied on documents provided by Warren to
formulate his own report and (2) questions posed to Kelly regarding Warren's report did not at
this time ask Kelly to opine on any of Warren's opinions.
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2.

Cummings' Request for Punitive Damages

Twenty-eight (28) days before trial, Cummings filed his Motion for Leave to An1end
Complaint for punitive damages. See R., Vol. 6, 1191-1193. After considering the evidence and
the parties' arguments, the district court declined Cummings' request, but stated ''I'm going to
deny the motion for leave to amend complaint without prejudice ... if at trial there's additional
evidence that comes up ... and you want to renew your motion, you can do that." Tr., Vol. 2,
1200: 13-17.
After Cummings rested his case-in-chief, Northern Title motioned for dismissal, first
stressing that Cummings had not proven punitive damages. See Tr., Vol. 1,738:6-9. To this the
district court answered, "[t]here is no punitive damages ... I didn't grant the motion to allow
them in." Tr., Vol. 1, 738: 10-11. Cummings made no objections. [d. Additionally, Cummings'
never raised the issue of punitive damages in his Post Trial Brief, or in his Reply Post Trial Brief.
See R., Vol. 8,1507-1532,1571-1585. Nor did Cummings ever seek, as he could have, to remotion the district court for punitive damages.

Concise Statement of Facts.
A concise statement of the facts is more fully set forth in Northern Title's CrossAppellant Brief However, for purposes of this brief, some additional facts are provided as to
Cummings' alleged "lost opportunity" damages, and his claim to Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) payments.
Cummings alleges he incurred three lost opportunities, including (1) development of
"view lots" on the east side, (2) development of an RV Park, and (3) that he could have gotten a
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"better deal" had he purchased the Jensen Ranch. See Tr., Vol. 1, 141:19-142:6. As to the "view
lots," Cummings had not made a business plan, did not know what profits could be obtained, and
provided no evidence as to the actual value of the lost "view lots." See Tr., Vol. 1, 339:8-17; see
also R., Vol. 8, p. 1627. As to the RV Park, Cummings has never owned an RV Park, has never
fully operated an RV Park, and has never developed an RV Park; he has no business plan, no
engineering plan, has not sought zoning changes, and has not done any financial analysis
concerning costs or income for the proposed RV Park. See Tr., Vol. 1 254:21-256:12. As to the
Jensen Ranch, Cummings visited the Jensen Ranch one time, driving past with a realtor. See Tr.,
Vol. 1,20:14-16; see also R., Vol. 8, 1628-1629.
Lastly as to CRP damages, Cummings never received an assignment of the CRP contract,
and stilI at trial had never seen the CRP contract. See Tr., Vol. 1,190:8-13,137:3-9.
AdditionalIy, the Real Estate Purchase Contract, purchased by Cummings from Three Bar,
makes no mention ofCRP income. See Tr., Vol. 1,816:24-817:19; see also id. at 794:8-13. In
fact, the CRP payments were assigned to the Phelps, who for all times relevant have leased the
eastern property. See Tr., Vol. 1, 777: 19-24; see also Phelps' Lease, Trial Ex. 64, <j[ 4 ("[I]essee
shall be entitled to receive the CRP ... contract payments").

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court's findings and conclusions in deciding not to grant

Cummings lost opportunity damages is supported by substantial and competent evidence,
sufficient to overcome the "clearly erroneous" standard.
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Standard of Review: The district court found that plaintiff produced insufficient
evidence to support a finding of lost opportunity damages. R., Vol. 8 , p. 1634 (Conclusion # 3234). This "Court reviews a district court's determination of damages pursuant to a clearly
erroneous standard." Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 529, 248 P.3d 1256,
1264 (2011) (citations omitted).
2.

Whether the district court properly denied CRP damages, and whether alternative

means in the record support the district court's decision.

Standard of Review: The district court held that "Cummings is not entitled to recover
any property, value, or interest for the Stephens' property located on the east side of the
highway." R., Vol. 8 ,p. 1634 (Conclusion # 31). Findings of negligence and causation should
be affirmed on appeal unless the verdict is "not supported by substantial competent evidence or
is against the clear weight of the evidence." Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 879, 204 P.3d 508,
519 (2009).
3.

Whether the trial court properly utilized its discretion in denying Cummings'

amended complaint for punitive damages, and/or whether Cummings' waived the issue when he
failed to object or re-motion the district court to reconsider punitive damages.

Standard of Review: Denial for punitive damages is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. See Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 315,17 P.3d 247, 259 (2000).
4.

Whether the district court rightly concluded, under the circumstances of this case,

that a tort of bad faith does not exist against Northern Title as escrow.
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Standard of Review: The district court held that the tort of bad faith does not
exist against Northern Title as escrow. See R., VoL 8, p. 1633 (Conclusion # 16).
Applying a new tort of "bad faith" against escrows would impose new duties, and
"[ w]hether a duty ex ists is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free
review." Gagnon v. Western Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., 155 Idaho 112,306 P.3d 197,200
(2013). The district court's findings should not be overturned as long as there is
substantial and competent evidence to support its decision. See Hummer v. Evans, 129
Idaho 274, 279, 923 P.2d 981,986 (1996).
5.

Whether the district court acted within the proper bounds of its discretion when it

excluded Cummings' appraisal expert for being untimely disclosed.

Standard of Review: "[T]he imposition of discovery sanctions under Rule 37(b) is
committed to the discretion of the district court, and the ruling will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion." Noble v. Ada County Elections Board, 135 Idaho 495, 499, 20
P.3d 679, 683 (2001) (citation omitted).

ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS ON APPEAL
Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party on appeal if authorized by statute,
contract or court rule. See Capps v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 149 Idaho 797, 744, 240 P.3d 583,
590 (2010) (citations omitted). Idaho Code section 12-120(3) "mandates an award of attorney

fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at triaL" Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 225,
192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008).
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Here, Cummings admits the dispute falls under the purview of Idaho Code section 12120(3). See Appellant's Brief, 47. That statute is applicable at trial, and on appeal. See Chavez,
146 Idaho at 225,192 P.3d at 1049. Therefore should Northern Title prevail on appeal, the
Court should award Northern Title its attorney fees.
As an alternative basis, Cummings agreed that "[i]f an action is brought involving this
escrow and/or Escrow Agent, the parties agree to indemnify and hold the Escrow Agent harmless
against liabilities, damages, and costs incurred by Escrow Agent (including reasonable attorney's
fees and costs) except to the extent that such liabilities, damages and costs were caused by the
gross negligence or willful misconduct of Escrow Agent." Escrow General Provisions, Trial Ex.
Ill, <j[ 17. As explained in Cross-Appellant's Brief, the district court erred in finding Northern
Title grossly liable under the Escrow General Provisions. Further, even though the district court
found Northern Title had breached the Escrow General Provisions, there was no damage
incurred, and therefore the entire action "failed." See Harris, Inc., lSI Idaho at 770264 P.3d at
409 (holding plaintiff's contract action failed absent proof of damages); see also R., Vol. 8, pp.
1626-1627 (district court holding Cummings failed to prove damages in connection with escrow
agreement). Therefore, the Court should award Northern Title its attorney fees on appeal.
Should Northern Title prevail on appeal, the Court pursuant to statute and/or contract
should award Northern Title its fees. Further if the prevailing party, Northern Title should be
awarded its costs. See I.A.R. 40(a).
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE RECORD SUBSTANTIATES CUMMINGS' FAILURE TO PROVE
LOST OPPORTUNITY DAMAGES, THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND HIS WAIVER THEREOF.
A.

Cummings' lost opportunity damages were based on nothing more than
bare intent.

Under Hummer v. Evans, "[ w]here a claim is asserted for the recovery of future benefits,
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove with reasonable certainty the amount of the loss
caused by the conduct of the defendant." 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (1996) (quoting
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977)). Therefore, "[t]his court

has explicitly stated that damages for loss of earnings or profits must be shown with reasonable
certainty and that compensatory awards based upon speculation or conjecture will not be
allowed." Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 761,519 P.2d 421,430 (1974) (citing Jolley v.
Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972)).

The district court held that Cummings had failed to prove lost opportunity damages. See
R., Vol. 8, pp. 1627-1629. Specifically, he alleged three (3) lost opportunities. First, use of the

east side to develop "view lots," second, the development of an RV Park, and third that he could
have purchased the Jensen Ranch for a "better deal." See Tr., Vol. I, 141: 19-142:6.
As to the RV Park, Cummings provided no evidence of damages. Cummings had never
owned an RV Park, had never fully operated or developed an RV Park, had no business plan, no
engineering plan, had not sought zoning changes, and had not done any financial analysis
concerning cost or income. See Tr., Vol. 1, 254:21-256:12. When asked "would it be accurate to

RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 8

say that this is largely just all in your head," Cummings responded, "yeah, it's a new concept ...
[a] new idea." Tr., Vol. 1,256:13-20. Similarly, as to the "view lots," the district court correctly
concluded "Cummings has provided no evidence on the value of the lost opportunity of the view
lots." R., Vol. 8, p. 1627.
As to the Jensen Ranch, Cummings visited the ranch one time, and could not provide any
credible basis for the value of that ranch. See Tr., Vol. 1,20:14-16; see also see also R., Vol. 8,
1628-1629. Despite his lack of knowledge, Cummings baldly asserted he could have gotten a
"better deal." See Cummings' Post Trial Brief, R., Vol. 8, p. 1529. Indeed, Cummings never
placed an offer on the Jensen Ranch, and presented no evidence regarding zoning laws, costs of
development, marketing, sales, time to market, etc. See R., Vol. 8, 1628-1629.
Cummings' claim for lost opportunity damages is analogous to Rindlisbaker v. Wilson.
There, a farmhand was paralyzed in a work-related accident, and based on a future plan to create
a cattle ranch, alleged lost opportunity damages. Rindlisbaker, 95 Idaho at 761,519 P.2d at 430.
Regarding that future plan, Rindlisbaker had "not entered into any lease arrangement for the
winter rangeland and had taken no action to convert hay ground into pasture ground." ld. The
Court held "the evidence ... shows little more than a bare intent ... [which is] too speculative to
be admissible as proof of lost future earnings." ld. (citing McCormack on Damages, p. 309, s 87
(1935); 45 A.L.R. 345, 381,419; Mathew Bender, Personal Injury, s 304(4)(c)(e); Jolley, 94
Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939).
Just as in Rindlisbaker, Cummings lost opportunity damages were just an "idea." He
admits the view lots were simply "a new idea," he could not provide evidence of income or
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costs for the RV Park, and his pursuit of the Jensen Ranch was limited to a one-time drive while
simultaneously seeking to buy the Stephens Trust property. See Tr., Vol. 1, 20: 14-16.
Further, Cummings' claims are against Northern Title, with whom he has contracts. Lost
profits are "generally not recoverable in contract unless there is something in that contract that
suggests that they were within the contemplation of the parties and are proved with reasonable
certainty." See Brown's Tie & Lumber Compan}', 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 423, 428 (1988)
(citing Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 110 Idaho 369, 378, 716 P.2d 513,522 (Ct. App.
1986). Thus in Brown's Tie & Lumber Company, the insured could not recover lost profits for a
defect in title where the parties did not contractually "contemplate ... damages, including lost
profits." See Brown's Tie & Lumber Company, 115 Idaho at 61, 764 P.2d at 428. Similarly here,
Northern Title never contractually bound itself against Cummings' speculative lost profits,:'
The Court should affirm Cummings' failure to prove lost opportunity damages.
Cummings' alleged damages were mere conjecture, and Northern Title never accepted liability
for such damages.

B.

The district court properly declined Cummings' emotional distress
damages where he voluntarily dismissed his sole emotional distress claim.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (I) conduct that is intentional and
reckless, (2) conduct that is extreme and outrageous, (3) a causal connection between the conduct
and the emotional distress, and (4) emotional distress that is severe. See Bollinger v. Fall River

Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 272 P.3d 1263, 1274 (2012). Additionally, when
3 Further, his suit was never even brought against the actual title insurer, Stewart Guaranty. See
R., Vol. 8,1612-1615.

RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 10

physical manifestations are classified as medical conditions, expert testimony is required. See

Cook v. Skyline Corporation, 135 Idaho 26, 34-35, 13 P.3d 857, 865-866 (2000).
In his Second Amended Complaint, Cummings alleged Northern Title's conduct was
"intentional, reckless, malicious, or wanton," and "outrageous, extreme, atrocious and beyond all
possible bounds of decency." R., Vol. 4, 20-21 (par. 97-98). Finding a lack of evidence,
Cummings stipulated to its dismissal:
OLSEN:

Thank you, your Honor. Let me start out with the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. And I think I
already mentioned in our Monday hearing that if there were
any claims that were plaintiff's weakest, that probably was
it. But we at least wanted to see how the evidence came
out in trial. So I think frankly speaking we would be hard
pressed to find evidence in the trial where there's been
intentional infliction of emotional distress. So we will -we'll go ahead and not object to dismissing that particular
claim.

Tr., Vol. 1,721:21-722:5.4 Indeed, Cummings was not hospitalized. Id. at 250:16-19. He was

not taking any medications. Id. at 251 :5-6. And though Cummings alleged the litigation
exacerbated his "immunity dysfunction," he provided no expert testimony. Id. at 125:5-12; see
also Cook, 135 Idaho at 34-35, 13 P.3d at 865-866 (distress manifested in a medical condition
requires expert testimony).
The only "emotional" damages referenced to in Appellant's Brief are that he had to "file
a lawsuit and subsequently endure the anguish and suffering now entering its sixth year since the

4 Despite Cummings' voluntary dismissal on the record, he again in his Post Trial Brief
referenced to intentional intliction of emotional distress as his only claim for emotional damages,
and argued for their application. See R., Vol. 8, pp. 1510, 1529-1530.

RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 11

purchase was closed." Appellant's Brief, 37. However, an "actor is never liable ... where he has
done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well
aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress." Mortensen v. Stewart Title

Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,446-447,235 P.3d 387,396-397 (2010). (citations omitted).
The Court should affirm the district court's denial of Cumming's emotional distress
claim, where Cummings failed to introduce evidence separate from litigation supporting such an
award, and stipulated, on the record, to its dismissal.

C.

Irrespective of any right to the eastern proper(v, Cummings failed to prove
a contractual right to CRP payments.

The Conservation Reserve Program ("CRP") is governed by the USDA Farm Service
Agency, where income obtained through that program is governed by contract. See 16 U.S.c.
3831 (a).5

The Montana Supreme Court explains, "CRP contracts provide payments to land

holders who set land aside for conservation purposes and requires that the land holders not grow
crops or permit grazing on those lands." Weter v. Archambault, 313 Mont. 284, 287, 61 P.3d
771, 773 (2002). Under well-established Idaho law, a contract "must be definite and certain in
its terms and requirements ... [because a] court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine
what it is." Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 751,864 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct. App. 1993).
Here, Cummings has failed to prove a right to the CRP payments. At trial, the parties
stipulated that "the CRP payment is $38.31 per acre, that there's 83 acres, that it works out to be

5 Section 3831 (a) of the Federal Security Act states: "the Secretary shall formulate and carry out
a conservation reserve program under which land is enrolled through the use of contracts to
assist owner and operators ofland specified .... " 16 U.S.c. 3831(a) (emphasis added).
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$3,221.23 a year for CRP payments, and that would have been paid each and every year since the
transaction[.]" Tr., Vol. 1, 716:6-9. Assuming, however, that Cummings is entitled to the eastern
property, he never proved his right to the contractual payments. Cummings admits he never
received an assignment of the CRP contract, nor had ever even seen the CRP contract. Tr., Vol.
1, 190:8-13, 137:3-9 (never saw contract prior to closing); see also id. at 288:7-16 (never
confirmed whether CRP payments transfer to him upon ownership). Additionally, the Real
Estate Purchase Contract, assigned by Three Bar, makes no mention of CRP payments. Tr., Vol.
1,816:24-817: 19; see also id. at 794:8-13. Rather, the contractual documents in the record state
that all CRP funds were assigned to the Phelps, who at all times relevant have leased the CRP
property. Id. at 777:19-24; see also Phelps' Lease, Ex. 64,

~

4 ("[l]essee shall be entitled to

receive the CRP ... contract payments"). Therefore, Cummings cannot claim right to the CRP
payments. Lawrence, 124 Idaho at 751, 864 P.2d at 197 ("court cannot enforce a contract unless
it can determine what it is").
CRP funds are a contractual right. Irrespective of any right to the eastern property,
Cummings failed to prove his contractual right to the CRP payments. In fact, the record shows
that those payments have been and are assigned to the Phelps.

D.

The Court should affirm the district court's denial of Cummings' motion to
amend for punitive damages; the district court reasonably considered the
evidence, and substantial evidence at trial supports its decision.

Punitive damages are not favored, and should be awarded "only in the most unusual and
compelling circumstances." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,
249,178 P.3d 606, 614 (2008). At the very least, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
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evidence that a defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, or outrageous. See

I.e. § 6-1604( 1).

Therefore, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving a bad act and a bad state of

mind. See Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 250, 178 P.3d at 615.
Even before asking for punitive damages, a party must motion to amend its pleadings,
and prove that there is a reasonable likelihood of proving punitive damages at trial. See I.e. § 61604(1). A denial is upheld as long as the district court realized it had discretion to allow or
prevent the issue from going to the jury, acted consistent with legal standards, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 315,17 P.3d 247, 259
(2000); see also Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213,218,91 P.3d 1117,1122 (2004) ("[w]e do not
presume error on appeal; the party alleging error has the burden of showing it in the record").
The district court did not abuse its discretion. Twenty-eight (28) days before trial,
Cummings filed his Motionfor Leave to Amend Complaint. See R., Vol. 6, 1191 1193. At the
July 17,2012 hearing, Cummings sought to add punitive damages for two reasons: (1) Northern
Title "changing the warranty deeds without first checking with Mr. Cummings," and (2) because
Northern Title chose to "side with - go with one side," i.e. Stephens. See Tr., Vol. 2, 1101: 16-17,
1102: 14-15. Northern Title rebutted as follows:
BERGMAN: The issue that really bothers me about these pumtIve
damages is where's the harmful state of mind? If you look
to Lori Thornock's affidavit, she states, "In the course of
the transaction, Northern Title's contact was limited to the
realtors Dorothy Julian and Evan Skinner . . . [which
indicated the Stephens only intended] to sell property west
of Highway 30. This was [Thornock's] understanding from
the very beginning."
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Tr., Vol. 2,1109:6-15. The district court in response carefully considered the facts presented up
to that point:
COURT:

I understand that.
But it can be determined by
circumstantial evidence and by inferences. I'm not saying
I'm ruling that way. I'm just saying there is that potential
out there; that a jury could determine that the title company
knew what they were doing when they changed the loan
documents, and they knew they were doing it without
Cummings' knowledge. That could be a problem for your
clients, if they go that way.

BERGMAN: And I agree with you if maybe that testimony came out in
trial, but that testimony hasn't come out now.
COURT:

I understand.

Tr., Vol. 2, 1110:13-25. Finally, the district court expressed its decision, which clearly indicates
an act of discretion and reason:
COURT:

I've been thinking about this punitive damage issue, and
this is how I'm going to deal with it for the time being: I'm
going to deny the motion for leave to amend complaint
without prejudice. Meaning, Mr. Olsen, if at trial there's
additional evidence that comes up that I'm not aware of and
you want to renew your motion, you can do that.

Tr., Vol. 2, 1200: 13-17. By way of analogy, in Polk v. Larrabee, the district court stated as
follows:
I've considered all of the allegations with regard to punitive damages and
as I've previously said ... the standard for this court is that there must be
substantial evidence to justify submitting this case to the jury. In my
opinion there is not sufficient evidence on the issue of punitive damages
upon which a jury could render a verdict that would award punitive
damages.
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Polk, 135 Idaho at 315, 17 P.3d at 259. From this statement above, the trial court had evidenced

the discretionary nature of its power, acted consistent within legal standards, and "as indicated by
its comments, it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." ld. Similarly here, the district
court below perceived its discretion, denying Cummings' motion "without prejudice," and
clearly felt that at that time, there was insufficient evidence to prove punitive damages by a
reasonable likelihood.
Three more points deserve attention. First, a party may not obtain punitive damages
unless there is "the invasion of a legally protected right." Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 308,
32 P.3d 695, 700 (Ct. App. 2001). Here, Cummings does not have the right to exclude Northern
Title from "siding" with Stephens in its defense. Cf Appellant Brief, 40-41. For instance, there
is no bad faith when a party challenges the validity of a fairly debatable claim. See White v.
Unigard Mut.lns. Co., 112 Idaho 94,96,730 P.2d 1014 (1986). Similarly, an "actor is never
liable ... where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way,
even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress."
Mortensen, 149 Idaho at 446-447,235 P.3d at 396-397.
Second, the substantial evidence at trial does not support an award of punitive damages.
See e.g. Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 308, 32 P.3d 695, 700 (Ct. App. 2001) (court
examines whether record contains substantial evidence to support punitive damages award). The
district court's specific findings, all supported by the record, weigh strongly against the finding
of punitive damages. First, the district court opened its decision by stating "while the Title
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Company did 'mess up,' the wrongs committed are not nearly to the extreme level claimed by
the Plaintiff." See R., Vol. 8, p. 1588 (emphasis added).
During November 2007, Thornock tried to contact Cummings to let him
know that Northern Title was changing the legal description on the
warranty deed but was only able to leave a voicemail on his answering
machine. 6
Northern Title's actions, in rerecording the November 8 warranty deed,
were made in good faith and on the reasonable belief that the property on
the east side of Highway 30 was not to be included in the transaction. 7
Northern Title did not rerecord the deed for the purpose of harming or
injuring Cummings. Thornock testified that a portion of Northern Title's
purpose in rerecording the deed was to protect Cummings from potential
lawsuits that might be brought against him over the mistaken conveyance
of the property on the east of Highway 30. 8
However, Northern Title had the understanding all along that the sale was
to include only that property on the west side of Highway 30. Northern
Title therefore contested Cumming's claims in good faith.9
Northern Title's information was that Cummings only received property
on the west side of Highway 30. 10
R., Vol. 8,pp. 1596,1599-1600,1611-1612,1616. Therefore, the district court's specific

findings, supported by substantial and competent evidence, show that Northern Title did not act
6 See also Tr., Vol. 1,537:8-13,538: 11; see also Tr., Vol. 1,468: 16-18.
7 See also Tr., Vol. 1,426:9-22; see also id. at Vol. I, 817:3- 818:11; see also Julian Published
Depo., 20: 13-20,21: 14-17,36: 15-22,38: 16-24, and 40: 19-41 :3.
8 See also Tr., Vol. 1, 468:6-18.
9 See also Tr., Vol. 1,426: 15-22.
10 See also Tr., Vol. 1,518:13-25.
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oppressively, fraudulently, maliciously, or outrageously; and certainly not with the had mind that
warrants the types of damages recoverable only in the "most unusual and compelling
circumstances." Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 249, 178 P.3d at 614; see also See I.e. §
6-1604(1).
Finally, Cummings waived the issue of punitive damages. When denying Cummings'
request for punitive damages, the district court clearly stated ''I'm going to deny the motion for
leave to amend complaint without prejudice ... if at trial there's additional evidence that comes
up ... and you want to renew your motion, you can do that." T r., Vol. 2, 1200: 13-17 (emphasis
added). After Cummings rested his case-in-chief, Northern Title motioned for dismissal under
Rule 41(b), first stressing that Cummings had not proven punitive damages. See Tr., Vol. I,
738:6-9. The district court answered, "[t]here is no punitive damages ... I didn't grant the
motion to allow them in." Trial TT., 738: 10-11. Cummings made no objections. Id. Neither did
Cummings' address punitive damages in his Post Trial Brief or Reply Post Trial Brief. See R.,
Vol. 8, 1507-1532, 1571-1585. Further, Cummings never re-motioned the district court for
punitive damages. Therefore, Cummings waived his punitive damages for appeal. See State v.
Lewis, 126 Idaho 77,79-81,878 P.2d 776, 778-80 (1994); see also State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho
346,349,883 P.2d 704, 707 (CL App. 1994); see also State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 448,816
P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.3d
504,506 (2009) ("party's failure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from
challenging that action on appeal"); see also Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d
355, 357 (1982) ("litigant may not remain silent ... and later urge his objections ... for the first
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time on appeal"); see also Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 Idaho 541, 544, 6 P.3d 397, 400 (2000) (even
if district court is mistaken, when a party fails to object, party fails to preserve issue for appeal).
The district court considered the parties' evidence, acted using reason, and denied
Cummings' punitive damages as authorized under I.C. § 6-1604(1). Therefore, there was no
abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding, Cummings waived the issue. He remained silent when the
district court's decision was raised at trial, remained silent in his Post-Trial Briefs, and despite
the opportunity "without prejudice," never motioned the district court to reconsider.

II.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT ENTERTAIN A NOVEL BAD FAITH
CLAIM AGAINST AN ESCROW, ESPECIALLY WHERE
NORTHERN TITLE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.
A.

Where Cummings has failed to prove that the district court's findings were
clear(v erroneous, he seeks an improper advisory opinion.

"Idaho appellate courts have often declined to address the merits of an issue where the
practical effect of the appellate opinion is merely conclusory." State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168, 170,
280 P.3d 195, 197 (Cl. App. 2012). Specifically, "rulings on those issues [that] would have no
practical effect ... constitute an impermissible advisory opinion." ld. (citing State v.
Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419, 272 P.3d 382,391 (2012»; see also Taylor v. AlA Services
Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 569 261 P.3d 829, 846 (2011) ("Court not empowered to issue purely

advisory opinions").
Additionally, once a finding of fact has been made, such will not be set aside unless
"clearly erroneous." Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also WanderWal v. Albar, Inc., 154 Idaho 816,
303 P.3d 175,180 (2013) (failed to defend against breach of real estate contract when failed to
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prove error on the record); see also Miller, 140 Idaho at 218,91 P.3d at 1122 ("[w]e do not
presume error on appeal; the party alleging error has the burden of showing it in the record").
"An appellant must support assignments of error with citations to the parts of the transcript or
record relied upon." ld. (citing LA.R. 35(a)(6)). However, a district court's finding will not be
overturned if there is substantial and competent evidence to uphold the finding. See Hummer,
129 Idaho at 279,923 P.2d at 986 (citations omitted).
Here, the district court dutifully evaluated the facts and determined that Northern Title
withstood Cummings' claims in good faith. See R., Vol. 8, pp. 1615-1616. The district court
found that Northern Title understood the sale included only that property west of Highway 30, II
and that Northern Title maintained that understanding all along; thus, "Northern Title's actions,
in rerecording the November 8 warranty deed, were made in good faith and on the reasonable
belief that the property on the east side of Highway 30 was not to be included in the transaction."
See R., Vol. 8, 1596, 1599-1600, 1611-1612, 1616-1617 (emphasis added). Additionally, that
Northern Title did not intend to harm Cummings, and even rerecorded the deed "to protect
Cummings from potential lawsuits." Id. 12 Further that Northern Title strove to contact
Cummings to let him know it was going to file the correction deed. Id. 13 Finally, that
Cummings' claims were fairly debatable.ld.

11 See Tr., Vol. 1,426:9-22.
12 See also Tr., Vol. 1,468:6-18.
13 See also Tr., Vol. 1,536: 13-537: 13; 538: II.
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Cummings does not dispute the above findings. Rather, he makes broad, conclusory
statements, without specific citations to the record, which do not convince a reasonable mind that
the district court's findings were clearly erroneous. See Appellant's Brief, 32-38. Thus, to ask
for this Court to determine whether a tort of "bad faith" exists, when the district court expressly
found that Northern Title acted in "good faith," seeks an improper advisory opinion.
Based on substantial and competent evidence, Northern Title acted in good faith, and
Cummings' claims were fairly debatable. Therefore, where the imposition of a tort of bad faith
would make no difference, Cummings improperly seeks a mere advisory opinion.

B.

The tort of bad faith only applies to insurance for failure of payment, and is
not invoked merely by disputing a claim in good faith.

The tort of bad faith "had its genesis in the peculiar nature of the first-party insurance
contract, [and] as explained in White v. Unigard, has no application outside the first-party
insurance contract." Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 276, 824
P.2d 841, 851 (1991). It "is founded upon the unique relationship of the insurer and the insured,
the adhesionary nature of the insurance contract ... and the unique, 'non-commercial' aspect of
the insurance contract." Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 317,
233 P.3d 1221, 1239 (2010). In contrast, an escrow "is not an agent at all, but rather the trustee
of an express trust with duties to perform for each of the parties, which duties neither can forbid
without the consent of the other." Foreman v. Todd, 83 Idaho 482, 486, 364 P.2d 365,367
(1961).
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Additionally, the tort of bad faith is "not simply bad judgment or negligence." O'Neil v.
Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 262, 796 P.2d 134,139 (CL App. 1990). Rather, it applies only "where
the insurer company refuses to honor a direct claim without a lawful basis for such refusal
coupled with actual knowledge of the fact." Id. The tort is strictly construed to apply to an
insurer's knowing and wrongful failure to make payment:
[P]ursuant to White, by definition, there is no claim for bad faith unless it
relates to an insurer intentionally and unreasonably failing to pay a claim
or compensate the insured ... [and such] a claim must relate to the failure
to pay monies that the insured claims he is owed. If the allegation does
not relate to the insurer's unreasonable failure to pay the insured, either
explicitly or implicitly, the insured has not stated a claim for bad faith.
Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902,907,980 P.2d 566, 571 (1999); see also
Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 649, 22 P.3d 1028 (2000) (refusing to extend bad
faith tort to unreasonable adjustment and overpayment); see also Simper v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. o/Idaho, 132, Idaho 471, 974 P.2d 1100 (1999) (refusing to extend bad faith tort to
rising of insurance premi urn); see also White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 101, 730
P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986) (refusing to extend bad faith tort to violations of Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act).
Here, the crux of Cummings' claim is that Northern Title aligned itself with Stephens
during litigation, rather than immediately settle its claims with Cummings. See Appellant's Brief,
36 (alleging a "united front"). A similar argument was made in Foreman v. Todd. There, the
Todds sold their land to the Fishers, and the Fishers assigned their purchase rights to Foreman.
Foreman, 83 Idaho at 483,364 P.2d at 365. First National Bank (closing agent) took many hats,
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where it drafted the assignment to Foreman, drafted the deed description used at closing, and
also acted as escrow. See Foreman, 83 Idaho at 485,364 P.2d at 366. When the deal went south,
Foreman alleged that National Bank had colluded with the Todds (the sellers) in failing to
provide marketable title, and therefore "was liable with them for defects in the title which the
Todds purported to convey." Id. The Court disagreed, holding that First National Bank was an
agent of no one, and that "Plaintiffs must look to their grantors, not to the depository nor its
officer, for title." Foreman, 83 Idaho at 486,364 P.2d at 367.
Similarly here, Cummings as the assignee of the Three Bar Ranches' REPC alleges that
Northern Title has colluded with Stephens in refusing to provide the title he wanted. See

Appellant's Brief, 36. However,just as in Forenwn v. Todd, Northern Title was not Cummings'
agent, and does not become liable with Stephens merely because Northern Title agrees with
Stephen's interpretation of the transaction. See Fore/nan, 83 Idaho at 485,364 P.2d at 366. If
Cummings is dissatisfied with title, his recourse, as in Foreman v. Todd, is to properly sue the
grantors of title, not Northern Title.
The tort of bad faith applies solely to the failure to make payment as an insurer. In
contrast here, Northern Title is not Cummings' agent, but rather is obligated to fulfill its
instructions, regardless of what Cummings' unilaterally wants. Thus, an escrow relationship is
very different from an insurance relationship, and Cummings' concerns regarding title are a
matter between him and the Stephens Trust, not Northern Title.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT EXCLUDED CUMMINGS' APPRAISAL EXPERT.
Under the district courts Order Setting Jury Trial, Cummings' expert report was due

March 13,2012. See R., Vol. 6,1091, <j[ 5. Northern Title's expert report was due April 17,

2012.Id. Rebuttal reports were due May 22, 2012.Id.

A.

The district court knew it was acting under discretionary powers, and
convincingly reasoned that exclusion was the fair and proper approach.

Once a discovery violation has occurred, "the imposition of discovery sanctions under
Rule 37(b) is committed to the discretion of the district court, and the ruling will not be
overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Noble v. Ada County Elections Board, 135
Idaho 495, 499,20 P.3d 679,683 (2001) (citing Ashby v. Western Council, 117 Idaho 684, 686,
791 P.2d 434, 436 (1990)). Further as to discovery sanctions, "we have consistently held that
such will not be overturned absent a manifest abuse of that discretion." S. Idaho Production

Credit Assn. v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526,528, 746 P.2d 985, 987 (1987) (citing Quick v. Crane,
III Idaho 759, 770, 727 P.2d 1187,1198 (1986» (emphasis added).
"An appellant bears the burden in establishing an abuse of district court discretion ...
[which requires the appellant to] show that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous and
that it did not properly identify and apply the law to the facts found." S. Idaho Production Credit

Assn., 113 Idaho at 528, 746 P.2d at 987 (citing Shelton v. Dia-mond International Corp., 108
Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985); Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 658 P.2d 992
(Idaho Ct. App. 1983). "There is no abuse of discretion where [1] the district court perceives
the issue in question as discretionary, [2] acts within the outer limits of its discretion and
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consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and [3] reaches its own
decision through an exercise of reason." Noble, 135 Idaho at 489,20 P.3d at 683 (citations
omitted).
First, the district court properly perceived that its exclusion of Cummings' expert
("Kelley") was an act of discretion. The district court's Order Setting Jury Trial expressly
provided that "[ w]itnesses not disclosed ... as required herein will be excluded at trial, unless
allowed by the Court in the interest of justice." See Vol. 6, 1091, <j[ 5 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the district court had excluded Northern Title's expert just days earlier, wherein it
stated "[t]he impositions of such sanctions is committed to the discretion of the district court."
R., Vol. 6, p. 1234. The district knew it was still exercising its discretion as to Cummings'

expert, where it viewed the exclusion of Northern Title's expert as closely linked to its exclusion
of Cummings' expert: "[e]ither I keep them both out or I let them both in ... I don't see any
other way to do it." Tr., Vol. 2, 1132:25-11 :33:3. Therefore, the (i) district court's discovery
order, (ii) its order excluding Northern Title's expert and (iii) its statements during the July 17,
2012 hearing, all suggests that the district court acted knowingly within its discretionary powers.
See Duspiva v. Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27, 293 P.3d 651 (2013) (where court did not expressly state
issue was a matter of discretion, "[t]he transcript is replete with statements from the judge
indicating that he perceived that [the admissibility of an expert] was committed to the court's
discretion") .
Second, the district court acted well within the outer limits of its discretion, consistently
with the legal standards and available choices. For instance in Priest v. Landon, where the trial
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court's order was clear, plaintiff's untimely 'rebuttal' expert was excluded, even though the
discovery order "unfairly" precluded plaintiff from producing a rebuttal expert. Priest, 135 Idaho
898,900-901,26 P.3d 1235,1237-1238 (Ct. App. 2001). The Court of Appeals held:
A district court has authority to sanction parties for non-compliance with
pretrial orders. Sanctions may include those enumerated in LR.C.P.
37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D) for discovery violations. One such authorized
sanction is the disallowance of specified evidence.

Priest, 135 Idaho at 900, 26 P.3d at 1237 (citing LR.C.P. 16(i); Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v.
Arnold, 121 Idaho 118,121,822 P.2d 1015,1018 (Ct. App. 1991); and LR.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B».
Similar to Priest v. Landon, the district court's order was clear as to when Cummings'
expert report was due. See R., Vol. 6, p. 1091,

~

5. Also analogous to Priest v. Landon, the

Court especially frowned against "stonewalling." Priest, 135 Idaho at 90 I, 26 P.3d at 1238.
Now in contrast to Priest v. Landon, here the district court's order expressly allowed Northern
Title to put on its defense by expert rebuttal testimony, to be disclosed no later than May 22,
2010. See R., Vol. 6, p. 1091, <JI 5. Cummings as Plaintiff knew this. But rather than supply his
expert's opinions, he deliberately waited until after Northern Title's deadline:
Because we had not received such a request before, Mr. Kelley was
anticipating to have that report prepared and submitted at the time of the
deposition [June 14, 2012]. Nevertheless... I pressed Mr. Kelley to
finish his report which we then provided a draft of one day prior to the
deposition.
R., Supp. Vol. 1, 11 (par. 6 of Nathan Olsen Aff'd). Therefore, the district court was well within

its discretion to exclude Kelley, where Cummings had precluded Northern Title from
formulating a rebuttal, and had admitted to violating the clear Order Setting Jury Trial.
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Finally, the district court's decision to exclude Kelly was a process of reason. First,
Cummings' disclosures were patently late. Under the district courts Order Setting Jury Trial,
Cummings' full expert disclosures were due March 13,2012. See R., Vol. 6, p. 1091, <]I 5; see
also Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). On March 13,2012, Cummings disclosed his intent to
utilize Kelley, but did not include any of Kelly's opinions. See Witness Disclosure, R., Vol. 4, p.
716. In fact, Cummings did not produce any of Kelly's opinions until June 14,2013, at 4:35
p.m., well after the due date and no sooner than the afternoon before Kelley's deposition. See R.,
Supp. Vol. 1, 57 (NT's Resp. Mem. to PI's. Mot. for Sanctions and Motion to Exclude Def's.
Expert). Even then however, the documents produced were a draft, unsigned, without any of the

numerous exhibits referenced to in the report. Id. It was not until the next day, upon Northern
Title's arrival to Kelley's deposition, that Cummings produced the final report, with exhibits. Id.
The district court was not convinced by Cummings' unbelievable "seasonable supplement"
argument:
COURT:

But where is his opinion?

OLSEN:

And that's what I'll get to, that point. I will admit
that we didn't provide a written report at that time.

COURT:

Not only a written report, but you didn't even tell
them what his opinion was going to be.

Tr., Vol. 2,1130:7-12; see also id. at 1130:18-22.

Essential to the district court's decision to exclude Kelley, Cummings' had successfully
requested to exclude Northern Title's expert appraiser, Warren. There was never any question
that Cummings bore the burden of proof on the value of the eastern property. See Hei v. Holzer,
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145 Idaho 563,567, 181 P.3d 489, 494 (2008) ("plaintiff, of course, has the burden to prove all
elements of [his] negligence claim, including damages"). Near the end of Kelley's deposition,
Northern Title introduced a report by their potential rebuttal appraiser, Warren. See R., Supp.
Vol. 1, pp. 58-59 (NT's Resp. Mem. to PI's. Mot. for Sanctions and Motion to Exclude Del's .
. 14

Expert).

While Warren's report was made months earlier, Northern Title prior to the deposition
did not even know whether Warren's report would prove useful, where Cummings had thus far
failed to disclose any of his own experts. ld. at 57 (Northern Title "precluded from having its
experts form their own opinions"); see also R., Vol. 8, p. 1456. 15 As it turned out, Warren's
report was useless. Cummings' expert had appraised the eastern property as of 2007, while
Northern Title's had appraised the property as of 2012. See R., Supp. Vol. 2, pp. 251-252.
Even though Cummings' had stonewalled Northern Title from forming a rebuttal,
Cummings veraciousl y objected, and moved to exclude Warren. See R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 44, et.
seq. Cummings argued such was the "typical" response to Northern Title's late disclosure, and a
"proper basis to strike expert testimony." ld. at 47. Seeing the hypocrisy in Cummings' request,
Northern Title acted quickly, and within twelve (12) calendar days moved to exclude Cummings'

14 Explaining (1) introduction of Warren report was due to Kelly's newly learned deposition
testimony that he had actually conferred with and relied on documents provided by Warren to
formulate his own report and (2) questions posed to Kelly regarding Warren's report did not at
this time ask Kelly to opine on any of Warren's opinions.
15 "In his Second Amended Complaint, Cummings asks the Court for damages, not quiet title.
Therefore, a critical part of Northern Title's case was and always has been its ability to rebut
Plaintiff's appraisal evidence of that land."
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appraiser Kelley. See R., Vol. 6, pp. 1060-1062 (NT's Mot. in Limine to Exclude). On July 6,
2012, the district court granted Cummings' request, and excluded Warren. See R., Vol. 6, pp.
1233- I 236. Later at the July 17, 2012 hearing, the district court granted Northern Title's request,
and excluded Kelley. See Tr., Vol. 2, p. 11:34: 10-13. Realizing what his actions had done,
Cummings moved the district court to reconsider, which on July 30, 2012, was denied. See R.,
Vol. 8, p. 1448-1450; see also Tr., Vol. 2, 1211: 19-1212:4 (July 30, 2012 Hrg.).
First, the district court rightly reasoned against a double standard, warning Cummings
"you've got to know that because I held the defendant to a strict standard on their expert, I'm
going to do the same thing with you." Tr., Vol. 2, 1124:23-11 :24: I. Second, the district court
was disenchanted with Cummings sandbag approach:
COURT:

Let me ask you this: If I allow this guy to give his expert opinion on the
appraisal, and it was disclosed on June 14th, how could they get an expert
to respond to what your expert's going to say within their time limits?

OLSEN:

Well, they could have, and they didn't. I mean, they might have a point
there, but I haven't seen any indication from them -

COURT:

It seems to me with Mr. Kelly, if I allow him to testify, I have to allow
their expert to testify because he's responding to Mr. Kelly. And if I'm
going to exclude their expert, then I exclude your expert. Because he
wasn't timely -

OLSEN:

Well, I don't think their expert was responding to Mr. Kelley. Their
expert was-

COURT:

I understand that. But he certainly could. And he couldn't respond to
them until he knew what Kelley's testimony was.

OLSEN:

I guess, you know, I suppose that's the case. But where they haven't even
disclosed a rebuttal witness, they haven't given any indication that they
intend to even call a rebuttal expert.
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COURT:

Well, they're defense, though. They can put on their expert in their case
in chief to rebut what your guy said in your case in chief.

OLSEN:

Yeah. But if they were going to name the rebuttal witness, they should
have done it, you know, under the timeline.

COURT:

They did. I just excluded him because he was untimely disclosed. But
I'm not so sure he's untimely disclosed for purposes ofrebutting your
expert. I mean, to me, it seems it's part and parcel of the same thing.
Either I keep them both out or I let them both in. I don't see any other
way to do it.

Tr., Vol. 2,1131:19-1133:3; see also iel. at 1133:19-25 ("[m]y point is that until June of20l2,
they didn't know what Mr. Kelly's appraisal was or what it was based on .... [s]o if I'm going
to let Mr. Kelley testify, I have to give them the opportunity to use their guy to rebut Mr.
Kelley").
When given the opportunity to have both experts in, Cummings objected, leading to the
district court's exclusion of all untimely disclosed experts:
COURT:

So if I'm going to let Mr. Kelley testify, I have to give them the
opportunity to use their guy to rebut Mr. Kelley.

OLSEN:

Okay. I'm fine with that. 16

COURT:

Even if that means changing his opinion to fit the 2007 deadline -- the
numbers. I can't -

OLSEN:

Well, here's my concern with that, your Honor, because I haven't seen any
disclosures from them since June 14th. Now we're five weeks --

16 Of course Mr. Olsen was superficially "fine with that," where the two existing reports were
completely incongruent; Kelly providing an appraisal as of 2007, and Wan-en providing an
appraisal as of 2012. However, the district court quickly perceived the shallow nature of Mr.
Olsen's stipulation, as shown by the district court's immediately next question.
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COURT:

Well, of course you haven't. I excluded him from testifying. So why
would they go get another report? This is going to be my ruling on Kelly
and on Northern Title's expert: Neither one of them is going to testify at
trial, because their opinions were late disclosed.

Tr., Vol. 2, 1133:23-1134: 13. Thus, Cummings was the victim of his own tenacious motion
practice. Due to untimely disclosure, he adamantly requested, and obtained, the exclusion of
Northern Title's expert. However, the district court aptly reasoned that in fairness, Cummings
own expert report, disclosed the exact same late day, should also be excluded.
The district court knew it was acting under discretionary powers, and it had the legal
authority to exclude Cummings' expert. The district court aptly reasoned that the fair approach
was to let both in, or exclude both, and when Cummings resisted giving Northern Title the ability
to rebut, the district court properly excluded both. 17

B.

The district court's exclusion o.lKelley is bolstered by Cummings' shallow
excuse, the prejudice incurred by Northern Title, and an undesirable
continuance.

In deciding to exclude a witness from trial, the court may also (I) consider the
explanation of the late disclosure, (2) weigh the importance of the testimony in question, and (3)
consider the possibility of a continuance. See Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271, 647
P.2d 311, 317 (CL App. 1982) (citing 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
327 (1970»; see also Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537, 539, 768 P.2d 800,802 (CL App.
1989).

17 No party on appeal contests the district court's exclusion of Northern Title's expert.
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It is unclear whether the district court was required to evaluate the factors in Viehweg and

Wiseman. Both of these cases, cited to in Appellant's Brief, regard a court's exclusion for failure
to disclose a lav witness' identity. See Appellant's Brief, 43-44; see also Viehweg, 103 Idaho at
271, 647 P.2d at 317 ("[ wJhen the identity of a witness is tardily disclosed, the trial judge should
... "); see also Wiseman, 115 Idaho at 539, 768 P.2d at 802. In contrast here, the witnesses'
identities were disclosed, but both were experts; subject to much more expansive disclosure
requirements. See LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i); see also R., Vol. 4, p. 716 (PI's. Supp. Disc. of
Witnesses). Further, Viehweg and Wiseman were evaluating a district court's power to exclude
under Rule 26(e)(4). In contrast here, the district court was acting under Rule 16(i), holding
"[n]either one of them is going to testify at trial, because their opinions were late disclosed." Tr.,
Vol. 2,1134: 11-13; see also R., Vol. 6, p. 1234 (holding "IRCP 16 is separate and distinct from
any discovery demands ... under IRCP 26 through IRCP 37").
Notwithstanding, the district court did substantively evaluate the Wiehweg and Wiseman
factors. First, Cummings' explanation for the late disclosure was undisputed, admitting by
affidavit to a "you did not ask so we did not tell" approach:
Because we had not received such a request before, Mr. Kelley was
anticipating to have that report prepared and submitted at the time of the
deposition [June 14,2012].
See R., Supp. Vol. 1, p. 11, <]I 6. Cummings' excuse was obviously inadequate, especially where
in excluding Northern Title's expert, the district court held just days earlier that "IRCP 16 is
separate and distinct from any discovery demands served by the parties under IRCP 26 through
IRCP 37." R., Vol. 6, p. 1234. Further, during Cummings' motion to reconsider, the district
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court stated "Gentlemen ... if my orders are going to have any meaning to them, I have to
enforce them. Particularly when the parties have moved asking me to enforce them." Tr., Vol. 2,
1211: 19-1212:4 (July 30,2012 Hrg.). Thus, the district court was not satisfied with Cummings'
blanket disregard for the scheduling order, especially where he had just asked the district court to
enforce the same against Northern Title.
Second, the district court weighed the importance of the evidence. The district court
held in excluding Northern Title's expert, just days earlier, "[h]ere, the parties have known from
the outset that the value of the property would be relevant on the issue of damages." R., Vol. 6, p.
1235. That issue, as the district court noted, was just as critical for Northern Title:
COURT:

Well, they're defense, though. They can put on their expert
in their case in chief to rebut what your guy said in your
case in chief.

R., Vol. 2, 1132: 16-18. Given the importance of the evidence to both parties, the district court
concluded "it's part and parcel of the same thing ... [e]ither I keep them both out or I let them
both in." Id. at 1132:25-1133:2. Clearly, the district court had understood and grappled with the
importance of such testimony for both parties.
Finally, the district court evaluated the time needed to meet Cummings' late disclosure,
and sua sponte, entertained the possibility of a continuance:
COURT:

Tell me what the prejudice is if I allow them both in.

BEARNSON: [O]ur expert, because he was excluded, your Honor, you
know, has not prepared a rebuttal in terms of plaintiff's
expert. And that would be a problem in this.
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COURT:

Well, that's the biggest problem I see here is that if I let
these experts in, we end up with a continuance [of trial].

R., Vol. 2, 1209:5-6; 1210: 11-17 (July 30 Hrg.). Thus, the district court knew that if Northern

Title were allowed a rebuttal, the trial would have to be continued. However, the district court
opted not to continue the trial, where Cummings could have established the value of the property
through other means:
COURT:

I do think there are ways the plaintiff can meet his burden of proof without
an appraiser. And you alluded to that. I think it is possible to do it in this
case. I'm just going to let things stand as they currently stand. I'm going
to deny the motion to reconsider.

Id. at 1211:19-1212:4.18

Notwithstanding the district court's thorough consideration in excluding Kelley,
Cummings attempts to twist the Noble v. Ada standard, arguing that somehow Cummings' ability
to call an expert, as the disobedient party, was more crucial than Northern Title's. See
Appellant's Brief, 44-45. The standard, set forth in Noble v. Ada, is that the court "balance[s] the

equities by comparing the culpability of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the
innocent party." Noble v. Ada County Elections Board, 135 Idaho 495, 499-500, 20 P.3d 679,

18 Indeed, Cummings' could have asked Stephens regarding the value of the eastern side, but
Cummings never asked. See July 17 Hrg. IT., 1068:10-16 (Stephens' deposition specifically
noticed up to preserve testimony for trial); see also id. at 1064:2-11 (Counsel for Cummings
admitting his mistake for not being physically present at Stephens' deposition); see also id. at
1070:9-12, 1076:8-15 (Cummings appeared telephonically for deposition, made numerous
objections, but asked no questions); see also id. at 1093:10-12 (Stephens planning on testifying
the next day at trial, if called to testify); see also Trial TT., 716:21-25 (Cummings resting his
case without calling Stephens).
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683-684 (2001) (quoting Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d 657,662 (CL App. 1996».19
Even though the district court was not required to expressly engage in a Noble v. Ada balancing
of the equities (see fn. 19, supra), it did.
First, the district court evaluated the prejudice to the innocent party, Northern Tile. The
district court's order specifically allowed for rebuttal experts. See R., Vol. 6, p. 1091, <]15. And
contrary to Cummings' arguments, a defendants' defense is just as critical as a plaintiff's
offense. For instance in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., the Court
reasoned as follows:
In baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is
more exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as
winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff
with a large money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who
simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore
the value of a successful defense.

Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho 716, 719 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005); see also State v.
Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 977 P.2d 203 (1999,1. Shroeder, dissenting) (the "Haw is that if the
evidence is that important to the State, it is certainly that important to the defense"). The district
court recognized this reality, finding that Northern Title's ability to rebut Cummings' expert was
critical and unfairly precluded:

19 Further, the trial court was not required to make express findings on these equities unless "the
sanction deprives a party of the opportunity to go forward on the merits of the claim." (citing
Roe, 129 Idaho at 667-68,931 P.2d at 661-62) (also citing Ashby, 117 Idaho at 686-87,791
P.2d at 436-37; Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 532,746 P.2d at 991). The cases of Roe, Ashby and
Astorquia, cited to by the Noble Court, all regard the striking of pleadings or claims, which is not
what the district court did here. Additionally, the district court expressly held that Cummings
could have proven his case in other ways. See Tr., Vol. 2,1211:19-1212:4.
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COURT:

The way I read his report, that's all he's doing. Your guy is
saying the property's worth a certain amount of money.
Their guy's saying it's worth a different amount of money.
That's rebuttal.

COURT:

I mean, to me, it seems it's part and parcel of the same
thing. Either I keep them both out or I let them both in. I
don't see any other way to do it.

Tr., VoL 2,1133:9-12; see also id. at 113] :19-1133:3. Thus, the district court properly
considered the prejudice to the innocent party, Northern Title.
Second, the district court considered the culpability of the disobedient party. Cummings
had completely failed to provide his appraiser's opinions until compelled by deposition on June
14,2012:
OLSEN:

And that's what I'll get to, that point. I will admit that we
didn't provide a written report at that time.

COURT:

Not only a written report, but you didn't even tell them
what his opinion was going to be.

Tr., VoL 2,1130:7-12; see also id. at 1130: 18-22. Aggravating Cummings' culpability, he had
just sought the exclusion of Northern Title's expert, disclosed a day late, the exact same as
Cummings' expert disclosure. Such goes directly against the rules of equity, where "he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands." Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 92 P.3d 492,
501 (2004 ) (citing Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 1374, 145, 657 P.2d 1, 9
(1983). Therefore, the district court aptly warned, "[k)eep in mind ... because I held the
defendant to a strict standard on their expert, I'm going to do the same thing with you." Tr., VoL
2, 1124:23-11:24: 1.
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Similarly in Noble v. Ada, the Court excluded the plaintiff's untimely expert where (l) it
violated an explicit pretrial order and (2) the time for the evidentiary hearing was nigh. See

Noble, 135 Idaho at 499-500,20 P.3d at 683-684. Here, Cummings' motion to reconsider was
not heard until the day before trial. In this vein, while Cummings cites to Viehweg v. Thompson
in opposition to the district court's ruling, that Court's reasoning resounds in favor:
The days are over - if indeed they ever existed - when litigants and their
attorneys could dictate the pace of the judicial process ... [a] district court
properly may perceive the private hardships of delay, and the public
interest in speedy resolution of civil disputes, without a distress signal
from a party whose case is stalled or from other litigants whose cases are
waiting their turn.

Viehweg, 103 Idaho at 315, 647 P.2d at 269.
While the district court's decision may not have been an easy one, trial was scheduled,
had taken three (3) years to arrive, and it was within the bounds of reason and equity to exclude
Cummings' expert. The importance of the testimony was weighed, the possibility of a
continuance was entertained, and Cummings' culpability was exacerbated by unclean hands.

CONCLUSION
First, the Court should affirm the district court's denial of lost opportunity damages. The
alleged view lots, RV Park, and Jensen Ranch were only an apparition of bare intent, were not
supported by a single damage number, no appraisal, no evaluations, no plans, just a "new idea."
Similarly, Cummings' claim for emotional distress was unfounded; he wai ved the same, and on
appeal, cites baldly to litigation stress. Further, even if Cummings had a right to the eastern
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property, Northern Title never contracted itself CRP income liability, and Cummings failed to
prove a contractual right to such payments.
Second, the Court should affirm the denial of punitive damages. The record affirms that
the district court knew it was acting under discretionary powers, and that it acted consistently
within the law and reason determining that any pretrial evidence did not rise to the level of
punitive damages. Further, substantial evidence at trial supported the district court's previous
conclusion. Notwithstanding, despite specific instructions from the district court, Cummings
failed to object, raise, let alone re-motion the court for punitive damages. Therefore, the district
court's denial remains proper.
Third, the tort of bad faith does not apply to escrows. It is unique to the insurance
relationship, and applies solely to disputes of non-payment. Neither are parties or at dispute
here, and further, the district court expressly found, and the record substantiates, that Northern
Title disputed Cummings' claims in good faith. Therefore, Cummings' request for this new
cause of action is both improper, and unnecessary.
Fourth, the Court should affirm the district court's exclusion of Kelley. The district
court's orders and the transcript evidence the district court's recognition of discretionary power,
and Cummings admittedly violated the district court's Order Setting Jury Trial. The district
court also aptly reasoned the fair approach to admit or exclude both. The district court
considered a continuance, decided against it, and did not abuse its discretion in excluding Kelley.
Therefore, the Court should deny Cummings' appeal against Northern Title, and award
Northern Title its fees and costs.
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